May Reading Project

This month I have been mostly reading The Conscious Mind by David J. Chalmers.

It's a full-on philosophy book, so it was really hard going.  But I did finish chapter 1!

Why so slow?

Apart from being a pretty slow reader, I only got one chapter read because I was taking Cornell notes as I worked through it. They take a lot of time and effort.  I understand better now why the students I teach hate taking them so much.

There were a few important benefits for me though:
   - Using them has left me with a feeling that I do understand what I've read
   - For the most part I can remember the key ideas
   - They provide a really nice summary to read over when I come back to take on the next chunk reading

I'll continue with Cornell notes for books that I really want to study rather than just read.

For books that I want to read, but might want to refer back to, I'm going to try sticky page-markers instead.  So for popular science or history books, I can just mark the key sections to refer back to later if the mood strikes me.

What did chapter 1 cover?

Chapter 1 introduces the idea of distinguishing between 'psychological' aspects of mind (which are studied well through cognitive neuroscience and psychology) and the 'phenomenal' aspects of consciousness (the actual subjective experience).

Making this distinction highlights how the two subtly different aspects can be confused.  We even lack a proper vocabulary for discussing the 'phenomenal' aspects - we can only describe them in terms of the external situations which give rise to them (e.g. the smell of freshly baked bread, the pain from a burn).

The chapter builds on this distinction, saying that while conscious experiences are likely deeply linked with psychological states, the question remains: how can a complex collection of systems such as the brain with all its psychological states give rise to a sensation of what it feels like to have those states?

Chalmers has already referenced many other thinkers with differing views on the subject and I'm really looking forward to seeing how he builds up these ideas and then comparing with some of the sources he cites.

I feel like I have a fair idea what Chalmers is getting at with this 'psychological' - 'phenomenal' distinction.  Going forward, I suspect I will have trouble distinguishing between the awareness of a mental state and the feeling of having that state.  Judging by the sources he cites though, I don't think I will be alone in struggling with that!



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